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Abstract

This research examines and quantifies the degree to which both information communication modality and the situational complexity affect individuals’ ability to process the provided information and determine an effective strategy. Human subject
testing herein consists of benign benevolent intervention involving the presentation of
a series of strategic situations. For each situation, a participant attempts to identify
their best response for a two-player, normal-form game with complete information.
In each such game, players seek to maximize their own utility while considering their
own actions, their opponent’s actions, and each player’s respective preferences over
outcomes resulting from the possible combinations of actions. Dual channel theory directly informs our experiment’s design; it specifies both the manner in which humans
process information and the existence of capacity limits to such cognitive mechanisms. Through a computerized test instrument, participants attempt to determine
the best response to normal form games of size 2 × 2, 3 × 3, 4 × 4, and 5 × 5, each
presented via three different communication modalities: audio-only, visual-only, and
audio-and-visual. To determine whether the difference in communication modalities
affected the strategic nature of decisions, participant responses were evaluated with
and without non-equilibrium models. Categorical data analysis techniques such as
the Generalized Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test and multiple-correspondence analysis
are first utilized on raw response information to determine the association between
actions and communication modalities. Utilization of the Cognitive Hierarchy model
characterizes the changes in the population’s average level of strategic thought based
upon varying communication modalities and situational complexities. Analysis shows
that inclusion of visual communication resulted in statistically significantly different
iv

participant responses and an increased level of strategic thought relative to audio-only
communication.
Within the same communication modality, the increased difficulty showed a gradual increase in strategic thought for the audio-only presentation. However, this increase was assessed to be upper bounded by a low-to-moderate level of strategic
thought. Visual-only and audio-and-visual modalities showed an increase in strategic
thought from 2 × 2 to 3 × 3 games, conjectured to the larger 3 × 3 games requiring
more concentrated thought, whereas the smaller 2 × 2 games being too simple to trigger enough response. This followed by a steady decrease as the difficulty in scenarios
increased to the maximum 5 × 5 scenario. Across all scenario sizes, a statistically
significant increase existed in the population’s average level of strategic thinking for
the visual-only modality compared to the audio-only.
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EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT: EVALUATING HOW
DIFFERENT COMMUNICATION MODALITIES AFFECT THE NATURE OF
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING USING COGNITIVE HIERARCHY

I. Introduction
Strategic planning is foundational to achieving desired organizational outcomes.
Within the military, such planning considers goals, capabilities, and resources – and
the same information about an adversary – to develop a competitive strategy that is
feasible, acceptable, suitable, and complete. The volume of information to process,
most of it written, can overwhelm even the best decision-makers, given they have
a limited time to understand, evaluate, and compare the strategic options. Within
the military context, a sub-optimal decision is inhumane, yielding undesired friendly
casualties, unnecessary adversary casualties, and greater risks to non-combatants;
the importance of making sound strategic decisions cannot be overstated. As a first
step to enable better strategic decision-making, this research seeks to understand the
manners in which humans are limited in their ability to process information within
the context of strategic decision-making.

1.1

Motivation and Background
Having priorities aligned with the National Security Strategy (Trump 2017) and

National Military Strategy (Mattis 2018), the National Command Authority (i.e.,
the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense) provides direction
to-and-through commandant commanders (CCDRs) for the development of plans to
implement and achieve strategic ends (i.e., desired outcomes). The commanders are
1

responsible for planning the ways (i.e., implementation plans) to achieve the ends,
whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the means (i.e., personnel, equipment, and
material) to support the CCDRs. At the national level, the development and communication of guidance to the CCDRs occur via a process known as Adaptive Planning
and Execution (APEX). APEX has four major functions: (1) strategic guidance and
planning, (2) concept development planning, (3) plan development planning, and (4)
plan assessment planning. The final process leverages the RATE (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute) methodology (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017), impelling commanders to
review and evaluate the plan continuously, and accordingly refine, adapt, terminate,
or execute it as strategic conditions change.
At the level of combatant commands, sub-unified joint commands, and joint task
forces (JTFs), strategic military planning is informed by doctrine, principles, and
concepts. Within the US Military, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Planning (Joint Chiefs
of Staff 2017) (JP 5-0) sets forth the doctrinal guidance of the Joint Planning Process
(JPP) for campaigns and operations. JP 5-0 also establishes the principles of joint
planning and the concept of operational design, the latter of which “provides the
conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff
2017). The principles of joint operations aid in the development of courses of action
(COAs) within the JPP. The concept of operational design seeks to address complex
situations via analysis to inform COA development amendable to varying levels of risk,
with flexibility. The JPP is a non-descriptive tool used by military planners to “frame
a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select
the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design
provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations” (Joint Chiefs
of Staff 2017).
The JPP has seven sequential steps: (1) planning initiation, (2) mission analysis,
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(3) course of action (COA) development, (4) COA analysis and wargaming, (5) COA
comparison, (6) COA approval, and (7) plan or order development. Step 1 begins
with the appropriate authority recognizing the need to employ military capabilities
to support national objectives or respond to a crisis. In Step 2, the CCDR and their
staff derive the mission statement by analyzing the problem and determining mission
accomplishment necessities. This effort provides information to subordinate and supporting commanders, allowing them to begin their estimates and planning efforts in
parallel. Step 3 involves the creation of COAs to address the problem statement. In
Step 4, the wargaming of each COA provides information to inform the analysis and
comparison of their relative advantages and disadvantages to performance criteria
developed in Step 5. In Step 6, the commander receives the results of the previous
staff work and decides which COA to implement, after which the staff disseminates
the plan to subordinate and supporting organizations and components during Step
7. Commanders exercise latitude and discretion regarding the degree of their involvement in the planning process. At a minimum, commanders receive a mission analysis
briefing after Step 2, at which point they issue guidance to the staff regarding COA
development, and a COA decision briefing after Step 6.
Somewhat complicating matters, the seven JPP steps roughly correspond to the
APEX functions. The APEX strategic guidance planning function aligns with JPP
Steps 1 and 2, and the APEX concept development planning function parallels JPP
Steps 3-6. Although the APEX plan development function is emulated by JPP Step
7, the plan assessment function within APEX does not have a formal counterpart
within the JPP (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2017).
One aim of the JPP’s formalized structure is to ensure that planning is deliberate
and thorough, such that decision-makers receive and consider requisite information
needed to formulate an effective strategic plan. The prescribed step-wise structure
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also makes the planning process somewhat standardized across different joint staffs,
ensuring new personnel can readily contribute. A second-order effect of this deliberate
standardization is that the JPP is process-driven: it requires considerable time, effort,
and personnel. Although some steps can be truncated, greater risk is incurred when
commanders and staffs do not take the time, or have the patience to, take part in the
JPP. Some departures from the JPP are notorious for the unfortunate outcomes that
resulted.
In 2002, as a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Anaconda sought to destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda forces near the Shahi-Kot Valley in
Afghanistan (Naylor 2005). This complex operation involved conventional US forces,
US special operations forces (SOF), the Afghanistan National Army, and paramilitary
forces. A projected three-day battle of light combat turned into an intense seven-day
battle with heavy combat, resulting in 58 US military member casualties and eight
deaths (Lyle 2009). Afghan forces suffered numerous wounded with three deaths.
Estimates on the number of enemies killed range from 50 to 500 (Kugler et al. 2009).
Analyses of the operation later identified several shortcomings that incurred unnecessary risk. There was a lack of coordination regarding fire support priority between
the conventional and paramilitary forces, an absence of unity of command on the
battlefield, and the hasty infiltration of SOF elements compromised their location
(Naylor 2005). Many of these shortcomings were ultimately attributed to poor planning and inadequate communication of those plans. According to Lyle (2009), “there
is no direct mention of anyone but the JTF staff participating in the formulation
of JTF mission analysis products, course of action development, or course of action
analysis.” The absence of decision-maker participation in the JPP undermined the
value it could have provided to inform sound decisions.
Therefore, the structure of the JPP provides a challenge. At its best, it can provide
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decision-makers with useful information. At its worst, it can overwhelm decisionmakers, causing them to set it aside, along with the information it could provide.
Core to resolving this conundrum is for the JPP to enable the clear communication
of a large volume of information to a decision-maker. How to effectively do so is the
focus of this work.
In addition to concerns regarding the volume of information in the JPP are issues
regarding the manner in which it is conveyed. Written documents both inform and
result from the JPP. As a type of bureaucracy, a commander’s staff ingests written
documents, and their orders are communicated in writing as well. Visual communication of information (e.g., via PowerPoint presentations) provides an alternative
to narrative exposition; however, since it can be imprecise in its meaning(s), such
communication must be used judiciously. Even when visual presentations are used to
convey information, military planners default to written documents to communicate
orders, frequently in large volume, thereby extending the challenge of information
overload to subordinate units. Also prevalent is the round table discussion, in the
form of back-and-forth deliberation from military planners to pass information to
inform decisions and strategies. This communication method is a purely audio one,
where an individual relies on hearing and little to no visual triggers exist to process
information.
Given the synchronous, simultaneous challenges regarding the amount of information and its communication, it is worth examining Mayer’s (2009) concept of multimedia learning. Supported by extensive research, the author explains that the
human information-processing system consists of dual channels: a visual channel and
an auditory channel. When adopting the sensor-modality perspective, whether the
decision-maker receives information by observing a visual presentation or reading
written documents, it is processed via the visual channel. After processing, informa-
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tion is brought into working memory to help develop mental models and corresponding strategies. The visual channel, like the audio channel, has a limited capacity for
information processing.
In the JPP context, having a decision-maker who is limited regarding the amount
of information they can process visually, as well as the abundance of round table
discussions limiting the information being processed from an auditory manner implies
that a reliance on visual-only or audio-only stimuli may correspond with unused
capacity to inform decision making. Whereas Mayer’s models present experimental
results supporting his postulates regarding information processing via dual channels,
it has not been determined whether-and-how leveraging those channels affects the
quality of strategic decisions made within a competitive environment. Accordingly,
this research examines and quantifies the degree to which both the method a strategic
situation is presented, as well as the complexity of the situation, affects individuals’
ability to process the presented information and determine an effective strategy.

1.2

Problem Statement
This research seeks to explore how the communication modality used to commu-

nicate information about a competitive situation affects a sample population’s ability
to reach sound, strategic decisions. The communication modalities considered will be
auditory, visual and a combination of auditory and visual. In contrast, analysis of
the participants’ decisions will be evaluated both with and without the use of nonequilibrium structural models. That is, categorical data analysis techniques will first
be utilized on raw response information to determine associations between selected
actions and communication modalities. Subsequently, the Cognitive Hierarchy model
will be utilized to characterize changes to the population’s average depth of strategic
thought (Camerer, Ho & Chong 2004). We will also explore the effect of the situa-
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tion’s complexity (as measured by the size of the game’s action space) on the quality
of the decisions. In so doing, we further the behaviorist approach to military operations planning (see Caballero et al. 2020, Caballero & Lunday 2020) by ascertaining
how the modality of inter- and intra-staff communication affects strategic decision
making.

1.3

Organization of the Thesis
The organization for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 for-

mally reviews the pertinent literature related to information processing, game theory,
behavioral game theory, and cognitive hierarchy models. Chapter 3 presents the designed experiment and methods of analysis for the results, whereas Chapter 4 presents
the results and analysis. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of results and proposes
extensions to this research endeavor.

7

II. Literature Review

This research focuses on whether and to what degree different communication
modalities used to present information affect a person’s ability to analyze a competitive situation and make sound strategic decisions for problems having varying levels
of complexity. Prior to reviewing the broader literature that informs this research, it
is first necessary to examine the definitions of learning, both in the pedagogical and
game theoretic sense. Subsequently, a review of the relevant pedagogical literature
discusses different styles of information processing and how it affects an individual’s
ability to reason and commit new information to memory for application in new situations. The review concludes with a two-part discussion of game theory that informs
the testing in this study. After reviewing the the structure of complete, normal-form
games, this section discusses related works from behavioral game theory and, more
specifically, the related theories used to evaluate and quantify the strategic soundness
of game theoretic decisions.

2.1

Learning in Education and Game Theory
The term learning has distinct meanings within the disciplines of educational psy-

chology and game theory, each of which informs this research. The initial focus of
this literature review pertains to the former framework; however, because much of the
testing herein relates to decisions within game theoretic frameworks, it is important to
present and discuss the definitions of learning from both disciplines before finalizing
the terminology utilized. Mayer (2009) defines learning within educational psychology
as the “change in knowledge attributable to experience” and partition learning via
changes to three components: change in the learner, change in the learner’s knowledge, and changes attributed to experience in the learner’s environment. Within game

8

theory, learning consists of the evolution of a player’s preferred decision(s) in a competitive context (i.e, a game) that occurs through repeated play (Fudenberg & Levine
2016). Beyond these primary definitions, other specialized denotations for learning
abound. From a philosophical perspective, learning is defined as how someone processes information in a pedagogical framework with documented principle traits like
“learning is change”, “learning refers to both a process and a product”, and “learning is different at different points in time”, to name a few (Alexander et al. 2009).
Within the educational psychology discipline, specialized terms like latent learning
(i.e., changes induced at a later time due to experiences (De Houwer et al. 2013))
pertain to specific aspects of the general terminology.
In this research, we adopt a perspective aligned with the educational psychology literature, specifically focusing on generative cognitive processing; that is, the
learner’s understanding of material presented, assuming cognitive capacity is available (Mayer 2010). Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, cognitive processing refers to
a subject’s comprehension of new information as an attempt to complete tasks or
develop reasoning to a strategic solution for problems of varying levels of complexity.

2.2

Cognitive Processing within the Pedagogical Literature
Within this section only, we refer to cognitive processing as learning to be consis-

tent with the pedagogical literature.

2.2.1

Theory of Multiple Intelligences

The theory of learning and being able to define the act of learning itself has taken
root in the field of psychology. Psychometrics, the study of physiological measurements, often uses the concept of general intelligence, which measures one’s cognitive
ability and human intelligence. Spearman (1904) first proposed the idea of a g f actor
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(i.e., general intelligence) in the early 20th century when observing a positive correlation in children’s performance across seemingly unrelated school subjects. Spearman
reasoned this correlation was due to an underlying factor in the children’s general
mental ability and suggested all mental performance could be categorized by a combination of a single general ability factor, g, and selected other ability factors that
are discipline-specific. Thomson (1916) later presented evidence that such interconnectivity between tests could exist, even without the existence of a g f actor.
Cattell (1963) suggested that general intelligence (g) could be subdivided into
fluid intelligence (gf ) and crystallized intelligence (gc ), two subcategories of ways to
process learning and apply gained knowledge. Fluid intelligence, the ability to solve
problems in new situations with logic, refers to analytical learning, where one needs
to solve cognitive problems through reasoning. Crystallized intelligence, the ability
to use knowledge previously acquired through experience and education, is measured
with general information, linguistic, and verbal reasoning tasks (Horn 1968).
Other variants of learning theory evolved that divide human intelligence into subcategories. Gardner (1983) proposed The Theory of Multiple Intelligences wherein
intelligence is divided into seven different modalities in lieu of a single general intelligence factor. The intelligence modalities are (1) linguistic intelligence, (2) musical intelligence, (3) logical-mathematical intelligence, (4) spatial intelligence, (5)
bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, and the personal intelligences, (6) interpersonal, and
(7) intrapersonal. Individuals with high linguistic intelligence were adept at reading, writing, and storytelling, thereby displaying a talent with words and languages.
Musical intelligence is exhibited by people able to play and compose music with a
keen sense to pitch, harmony, and sound. Learners with high logical-mathematical
intelligence excel with numbers, logic, and problem-solving. Spatial intelligence relates to one’s ability to visualize with the mind’s eye. Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence
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represents someone’s control of body motion. Interpersonal acumen refers to one’s social intelligence characterized by other people’s feelings, behaviors, and group working
ability. Intrapersonal intelligence measures one’s ability to self reflect and understand
their weaknesses and strengths (Gardner 1983).
After its initial development, Gardner (1995) would add naturalistic intelligence,
an eighth intelligence modality to the model; it characterizes the ability to be nurturing and relate information to one’s natural environment. Gardner (2000) also
suggested the existence of an existential intelligence (i.e one’s spiritual connection)
but did not commit it as a formal component of the model. Additional educational
researchers have investigated and debated the idea of such intelligence (e.g., Tupper
2002, Simmons 2006).
Each of the proposed intelligences was validated against eight criteria established
by Gardner (1983). These criteria established independence among the different intelligences and consist of (1) potential isolation by brain damage, (2) existence of
savants or exceptional people, (3) an identifiable core set of operations, (4) distinctive developmental history, (5) evolutionary history or plausibility, (6) support from
experimental psychological tasks, (7) support from psychometric findings, and (8) the
intelligence is capable of being represented symbolically.
Although Gardner (1995) argued otherwise, the theory of multiple intelligence
(MI) is sometimes referenced as pseudoscience due to lack of evidence. Additionally,
the field of neuroscience does not support the idea of multiple intelligences. “Neuroscience researchers have not claimed that individual human perceptual processes
such as taste or vision are intelligences or that innate skills, such as spatial navigation, or learned skills, such as music composition, are intelligences” (Waterhouse
2006). Setting aside any debate over the existence of specific intelligences, it is worth
considering the theories and empirical support specific to learning.
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2.2.2

VARK

Whereas Garner’s research sought to understand and evaluate one’s intelligence,
selected pedagogical research (e.g., Jung 1921, Myers 1962, Fleming & Mills 1992)
postulated the concept of learning styles to characterize how an individual learns.
Specifically, a person’s learning style is their preferred method of information processing. Learning styles take root from personality types explored originally by Jung
(1921), who separated them into four groups: (1) extroversion/introversion, (2) sensation/intuition, (3) thinking/feeling, and (4) judging/perceiving. This taxonomy was
later integrated into the well known Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (Myers 1962).
Learning styles were researched by Fleming & Mills (1992), who discovered that
different methods of presenting material (i.e., styles) could affect student’s understanding of the material. This motivated the concept of a teacher embracing their
students’ preferred learning styles to support better attainment of educational outcomes. The authors developed a taxonomy of learning styles and an instrument to
assess the relative preference of an individual over those styles. The acronym VARK
represents four learning styles: (1) Visual (V) - graphical and symbol information,
(2) Aural (A) - heard information, (3) Read/Write (R) - printed information, and (4)
Kinesthetic (K) - practice and experience.
The VARK questionnaire determines which of four learning styles a subject prefers
for processing information. Beyond its aforementioned use by teachers, the result of
a VARK assessment can also be used by a learner to improve information processing
should there be a misalignment between their preferred learning style and a learning
environment; if the learner cannot change the environment, they can at least be more
cognizant of the misalignment and commit additional effort to successfully process
information via their lesser-preferred style (Fleming & Mills 1992). The VARK assessment has a relatively short completion time, and responses have shown to help
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overall learning when adjusting and using new study skills. A VARK learning style
relies on neither natural intelligence nor inherent skill; instead, it focuses on how one
can absorb, acquire, and process new information or knowledge (Othman & Amiruddin 2010). The VARK construct of learning styles, as well as variants thereof, is not
without controversy. Many researchers and educators (e.g., Black 2016, Newton &
Miah 2017, Felder 2020) contest their validity and use. As such, we set aside consideration of learning styles for this research and examine more empirically grounded
theories relating to the information processing component of learning.

2.2.3

Dual Coding Theory, Dual Channel Theory, and Multimedia
Learning

Whereas learning styles attempt to categorize people based on different abilities
to learn new information, Paivio (1969) propounded an alternative approach known
as dual coding theory. According to dual coding theory, a person uses both visual
and verbal information to represent knowledge. Visual and verbal information are
each respectively received and processed within two “cognitive subsystems.” These
subsystems are used to process incoming information from non-verbal occurrences
(analog codes) and language (symbolic codes). Analog codes store images, and symbolic codes are used to store images of letters and words. Paivio (1969) studied a
learner’s ability to recall images and words in sequential order and found participants could recall the sequential order of words more readily than the ordering of
images. This experiment supports dual coding theory’s hypothesis that verbal and
visual information are processed differently.
The idea of two cognitive subsystems processing new information, one verbal and
one nonverbal, gave rise to Mayer’s (2009) cognitive theory of multimedia learning.
According to Mayer (2009), “the cognitive theory of multimedia learning assumes that
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the human information-processing system includes dual channels for visual/pictorial
and auditory/verbal processing, each channel has limited capacity for processing, and
active learning entails carrying out appropriate cognitive processing during learning.”
The two channels within Mayer’s research extend the concept of two cognitive subsystems from Pavio’s theory.
The broader cognitive theory of multimedia research holds three assumptions to be
true: (1) dual channels, (2) limited capacity, and (3) active processing. Dual channels
reference dual coding theory (Paivio 1990); learners use two separate channels for processing visual and auditory information. Limited capacity dictates that each channel
has a limit to the amount of information it can process. Active processing exists when
“humans engage in active learning by attending to relevant incoming information, organizing selected information into coherent mental representations, and integrating
mental representations with other knowledge.” Active processing conflicts with the
prevailing conceptions that people record their experiences in memory to be retrieved
later. The cognitive theory of multimedia learning is sequenced into five steps that
must occur for meaningful learning to take place in a multimedia environment: (1)
selection of relevant words for verbal working memory, (2) selection of relevant images
for visual working memory, (3) organization of the selected words into mental models
that are verbal, (4) organization of the selected images into visual mental models,
and (5) the integration of the word-based and image-based representations (Mayer
2009).
Relative to the pedagogical VARK framework or the preceding dual coding theory, Mayer’s (2009) theory of multimedia learning is grounded in several empirically
supported principles. The coherence principle identifies that removing extraneous
material helps people learn. The signaling principle emphasizes the use of cues that
highlight essential material to assist learning. The redundancy principle indicates that
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people learn better with paired graphics and narration than graphics and printed text.
The spatial principle states that graphics and paired text should be printed near each
other instead of apart, and the contiguity principle stresses that paired words and
images should be presented simultaneously rather than successively. Whereas the
previous five principles are associated with removing extraneous processing, the segmenting, pre-training, and modality principles are for managing essential processing.
The segmenting principle emphasizes that people learn better when the multimedia
information presented is divided into user-paced segmentation instead of continuous
instruction. Pre-training indicates that people learn better from a multimedia message clearly communicating the central concept’s definitions and characteristics. The
modality principle refines different types of presented information; people tend to
learn better from pictures paired with spoken words than printed words alone. Two
more principles which foster generative processing are the multimedia principle that
stresses people learn better with pictures and words instead of words alone, and the
personalization principle that indicates language written in a conversational style,
rather than formal, encourages better learning (Mayer 2009).
There are limitations to the cognitive theory of multimedia learning; it has been
shown to be more beneficial when the learner has a lower level of prior knowledge
about the subject. However, the theory proves most effective when the material is
complex and presented at a rapid pace or to a large quantity for the learners (Mayer
2009). For the military planning challenges that motivate this study, the latter point
is essential when considering both the large amount of information that planners need
to process and the level of risk involved when learning is not effective. Multimedia
learning stresses the importance of using both visual and verbal media to inform
learners. The assumptions establish how working memory is used with the two channels that process new information. Although there is empirical evidence supporting
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the principles, Mayer’s theory is not yet accepted as universal truth. There is concern that the principles will not hold outside of simulated experimental conditions.
For example, one study found that, if the material was of interest to the learners,
extraneous material did not significantly affect performance (Muller et al. 2008).

2.2.4

VARK versus Multimedia Learning

While learning styles are commonly embraced for use in educational environments,
research finds its methods for determining how a learner processes and retains visual
and auditory information questionable. In a study (Cuevas & Dawson 2018) involving 204 university students, no significance was identified in the correlation between
the students’ VARK-identified preferred learning style and their ability to learn and
retain information provided via visual or aural methods. However, the study did
show students receiving the information visually retained twice as much information
as those receiving it via auditory means. This result strongly supports dual coding
theory. Because the evidence does not strongly imply learning styles provide a viable
assessment of an individual’s ability to process new information, and with strong empirical evidence supporting multimedia learning, dual coding theory specifically, this
research adopts a multimedia learning perspective when studying a decision maker’s
ability to make effective strategic decisions.

2.3

Game Theory
Classical game theory involves the identification of a prescribed action (or strat-

egy) by each of a number of decision makers (i.e., players), wherein each player exhibits a preference over the outcomes resulting from their collective actions. Within
such a context, the players seek to rationally maximize the utility obtained, as it
corresponds to the possible outcomes.
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Rationality is generally consistent with a player who maximizes their expected
utility. In developing the axioms for utility theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) showed that, when someone’s choices are structured to satisfy completeness,
transitivity, substitutability, decomposability, monotonicity, and continuity, there exists utility functions that players will attempt to maximize. Player preference can be
explained with the use of lotteries, which are probability distributions defining selection of outcomes. Game theory studies the interaction among assumed self-interested,
rationally thinking, independent players who presume their opponents are rational as
well. Self-interested players can describe possible states of the world they prefer and
those they do not. Rational players have clear preferences and seek to maximize their
payoffs. Independence refers to lotteries, where a player preferring choice A to B must
also prefer the lottery of A to C, with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively, to the
lottery of B to C with the same probability distribution (Shoham & Leyton-Brown
2008).

2.3.1

Normal-Form Games

To assess an individual’s strategic thinking, this research will examine their decisions for normal form games, also known as strategic form games or simultaneous
games. Normal form games are fundamental non-cooperative games within the discipline; most representations of strategic interactions can be represented via a normal
form game. Normal form games are presented by a tuple hN, A, ui, where N is a finite
set of players, indexed by i with n = |N |; A is a cross product of Ai , the respective
set of actions available to each player i; and u is a vector of n utility functions (i.e.,
ui ∀i ∈ N ), each of which maps an action a ∈ A to a real number in R (see Shoham
& Leyton-Brown 2008).
Normal form games can be represented visually as an n-dimensional matrix. Two
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player games can be represented by a matrix wherein each row corresponds to an
action a1 ∈ A1 for Player 1 (w.l.o.g.), each column corresponds to an action a2 ∈ A2 for
Player 2, and each element a = (a1 , a2 ) yields an outcome of paired utilities (u1 , u2 ).
X
Constant sum games are a type of normal form game, wherein
ui = c, ∀ a ∈ A,
i∈N

and zero-sum games are a special case with c = 0. Often in normal form games,
players are assumed to have complete information, such that all knowledge about
a player’s actions, including utilities payoffs, are known (Shoham & Leyton-Brown
2008).
Assuming complete information, normal form games solution concepts are applied
to determine what player i’s best response is to an opponents’ strategy profile s−i . A
0

strategy for player i, si , dominates another strategy, si , when the payoff of si is the
0

same or better than strategy si no matter what action the other players choose. A
strategy for player i is considered dominant when it dominates all other strategies.
Conversely, a strategy is considered dominated if choosing it always yields the same
or worse utility than choosing an alternative strategy, regardless of the action chosen
by the opposing players. Dominated strategies can be removed from consideration,
as a rational player would never select them over a non-dominated strategy. This
iterative reduction can lead to reduced games with a best response. A player’s best
response is not necessarily unique, and without knowing the other player’s strategy,
it is not a solution concept (Shoham & Leyton-Brown 2008).
A concept of all player’s mutual best response can be leveraged to define a game’s
Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium (Nash 1951), known as stable strategy profile,
describes a set of actions taken by all players wherein no individual player has any
incentive to deviate unilaterally from the action profile. A normal form game may
contain more than one Nash Equilibrium, and, assuming that only pure actions are
permissible, there is no guarantee a Nash equilibrium will exist in a normal form
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game. When the action space expands from pure strategies to mixed strategies, each
player’s strategy si is a probability distribution over their actions rather than a single
action, and the other players’ strategies are represented by s−i . The combination
of all players’ strategies is s = (s1 , s2 , ..., sn ) or, equivalently, s = (si , s−i ). Through
Nash’s theorem, every game with a finite number of players and a finite action space is
guaranteed to have at least one Nash Equilibrium, when allowing for mixed strategies.
In addition to the Nash equilibrium, other solution concepts for normal form games
exist, such as the maxmin strategy, where a player i, maximizes their minimum utility,
assuming that all other players will collectively select the most damaging strategy
to ui . While it may seem unreasonable, as it assumes the other players are solely
interested in minimizing player i’s utility, this strategy is a practical approach for
a player who desires to act conservatively without making assumptions about the
other players. Other popular solution concepts in normal form games use the concept
of regret, the difference in utility between playing an action compared to the best
response. The minimax regret strategy requires the player to evaluate all alternatives’
values of regret and choose the decision that yields the smallest maximum regret (i.e.,
minimize the worst-case regret) (Shoham & Leyton-Brown 2008). Although these
solution concepts are outside to this research’s scope, they offer alternative solutions
dependent on a player’s tolerance of regret and loss.
Whereas normal form games consider players acting simultaneously, extensive
form games consider players acting sequentially. Nash equilibrium of extensive-form
games can be found through its induced normal form, but can also be found by working with the extensive form directly, such as through backward induction (Shoham &
Leyton-Brown 2008). Classical game theory also considers players’ interactions in a
hybrid of normal and extensive form games via repeated normal form games.
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2.3.2

Behavioral Game Theory

Whereas standard game theory generally attempts to find saddle points in the
solution spaces associated with rational players (i.e, homo economicus), behavioral
game theory attempts to model the empirical behavior of human subjects. According
to Camerer (2011), behavioral game theory expands on analytical game theory by
including emotions, player intelligence, mistakes, limited foresight, and doubts. Behavioral game theory attempts to explain the choices made by players that classical
game theory does not.
Arguably the earliest work associated with behavioral game theory corresponds to
empirical evidence refuting the descriptive use of expected utility theory. Allais (1953)
considered two experiments, each with two choices. Suppose experiment one contains
choice A, where a person would receive one million dollars for certainty (probability
1) and choice B, where someone would receive one million for 89%, five million for
10% and nothing for 1%. Most people tended to prefer certainty, and selected choice
A, implying that the person’s utility, u, for choice A is greater than the utility for
choice B (1 × u(one million)> .89 × u(one million) +.10 × u(five million) +.01 × u(0)).
Recognizing the probability of 1 from choice A can be rewritten as .89 + .11 , the
relationship between the lotteries can be rewritten and simplified as .11 × u(one
million)> .10 × u(five million) +.01 × u(0). Experiment two contains choices C,
where a person would receive nothing for 89% and one million for 11%, and choice
D, where a person receives nothing for 90% and five million for 10%. Here, because
the chances of winning were very similar except for the greater prize, most people
selected choice D, implying the utility for choice C is less than the utility for choices
D (.11 × u(one million)+.89 × u(0)< +.10 × u(five million) +.01 × u(0)+.89 × u(0))
which simplifies to .11 × u(one million)< +.10 × u(five million) +.01 × u(0); a direct
contradiction to what was shown in the first experiment. This result is known as an
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Allais paradox, and serves as a counterexample illustrating how people’s actions can
violate the independence axiom in expected utility theory.
Another axiom contradicting experiment, known as the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg
1961) shows people will make choices that violate the postulates of expected utility
theory when dealing with a situation of uncertainty (i.e., unknown future events
without probabilistic characterization). Ellsberg (1961) conducted an experiment
involving two urns and two different colored balls. Urn A contains a 50/50 ratio of
red balls to black balls, but Urn B has an unknown ratio. The participant picks an
urn and color, and draws a ball at random. If the color is successfully predicted, they
win. Most participants picked a color from Urn A, even though it violates the axioms
of expected utility theory. According to expected utility theory, if the participant
believes picking a red ball from Urn A was the optimal choice, it is because they
believed fewer than 50% of the balls in Urn B were red. However, this belief means
that more than 50% of the balls in Urn B are black, so the participant should have
selected Urn B. Ellsberg theorized this paradox exists because expected utility theory
applies to player preferences in situations involving risk but not uncertainty.
Collectively, these paradoxes impel the study of behavioral game theory to examine situations wherein players make decisions to maximize their respective utilities,
but their solutions deviate from those for a rational actor seeking to maximize their
utility under the axioms of expected utility theory.

2.3.3

Canonical Games in Behavioral Studies

Beauty contest games were made famous by Keynes (1936), who described a
newspaper contest where participants had to select the most beautiful proportion p
of n individuals whose photos were depicted in the newspaper. An individual wins
the contest if their answer is closest to the aggregate assessment of the group of
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participants. To win, an individual must not just consider their own opinion (i.e.,
one-step reasoning), but the opinions of others (i.e., two-step reasoning). Keynes
(1936) would note that players who are thinking at the third degree are not trying
to report their score or predict the average score, but are devoting “intelligences to
anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be” (i.e., three-step
reasoning). This strategic degree of reasoning can extend ad infinitum, subject to
one’s strategic reasoning capacity and understanding of the contest.
First presented by Moulin (1986), an alternative form to this game is referred
to as a p-beauty contest games. Consider a game where each participant chooses a
number between zero and 100 inclusively. Given a previously revelated parameter p,
the winner of the game is the player whose number is closest to p times the average of
all player’s numbers. Beauty contest games can be utilized to evaluate different levels
of reasoning. When experimentally studied with p =

2
3

(Nagel 1995), results showed

the average response was 35, with many respondents selecting 33 (one-step reasoning,
as 33 equals 2/3 of the mean if selections are made via a random uniform distribution
U[0,100]) or 22 (two-step reasoning, as 22 equals 2/3 of 33). The number of subjects
who selected zero, the value to which the solution converges as the level of reasoning
increases, was very few. Ho et al. (1998) expanded on this study by comparing values
of p < 1 to p > 1 using values of 0.7, 0.9, 1.1 and 1.3. Subjects played a game ten
times with a specified p < 1 (or p > 1) and subsequently played another game with
p > 1 (or p < 1). This was conducted to compare individual’s behavior when the
Nash equilibrium was 0 (when p < 1) and when the Nash equilibrium was 100 (when
p > 1). Results showed that participants who first played a p > 1 game tended to
start with high initial guesses for p < 1 games, but their strategy would converge to
0 more rapidly than it had converged to 100 in the previous game, indicating they
had “learned to learn” by playing both games.
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Güth et al. (1982) studied the “ultimatum” game. In this two-player, extensive
form game, the first player who is known as the proposer splits a fixed reward in two
and offers one proportion p ∈ [0, 1] to the second player, the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, both each receive their portion of the reward; if the responder
rejects the offer, they receive nothing. So long as the proposer offers some p > 0,
the subsequent best response is to accept the offer. Using inductive logic, the best
strategy for the proposer is to offer the smallest p > 0 possible. However, empirical
evidence suggests proposers offer 40 percent of the total amount on average, and responders reject roughly half of positively-valued proposals with p < 0.2. (Camerer
2011). This behavioral preference was also exhibited in chimpanzees (Proctor et al.
2013), who preferred an equal split of the rewards.
A variant of the ultimatium game is known as the dictator game, wherein the
responder is removed. In dictator games, the proposer chooses a proportion p of a
reward to send to the other player. Rationally, to maximize utility, the proposer
would send nothing (i.e., p = 0) and keep everything. From a behavioral perspective,
whether out of fear of social rejection or an altruistic personality trait, dictators may
deviate from a rational best response and propose some p > 0 to the other player. An
experiment (Allgaier et al. 2020) conducted on children ranging from seven to eleven
years of age using candy observed that children offer 40 percent of the candy in the
dictator game, compared to 50 percent of their candy in the ultimatum game.
The gift exchange game is a two player game introduced by Akerlof & Yellen (1990)
to model labor relationships. The two players are the employer, who first must decide
to pay a higher or lower amount of wage, and the employee, who subsequently decides
a level of effort put forth on work. Whereas an employer would prefer to pay a higher
wage and have a high level of employee effort over any other outcome, the employee
would most prefer a high wage and low effort. Knowing the employee’s best response
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to a high wage is not high effort, employers will pay the lower salary, creating the
equilibrium for the gift exchange game to be a low salary, low effort. Fehr et al. (1993)
conducted an experiment using buyers as price setters (income level) and sellers as
determiners of product quality (effort). Contrary to the solutions expected via a
classical game theory analysis, when the buyers set the price substantially higher
than market-clearing levels, the seller would respond with high quality levels (i.e., a
high income-high effort solution). In a computerized experiment involving students,
Maximiano et al. (2007) observed average effort levels increase with income, and less
than 25 percent of participants with a high income chose to exert a low effort. These
outcomes likewise differed from the expected outcome of a classical game theoretic
equilibrium informed by rational, utility maximizing decision makers.
Studied by Rosenthal (1981), the centipede game is a two player game with alternating turns until the game (finitely) ends. At each turn, a player can either “take”
or “pass.” If a player chooses take, they receive a large percentage (i.e., greater than
50%) of an available reward and the other player receives the remainder. Should the
player pick pass, they increase the size of the net reward, and provide the other player
a chance to either take or pass. Payoffs are set in such a manner that (1) a player will
receive a lower amount of reward if they pass and their the opponent chooses to take
in the next round, but (2) they will receive a greater amount of reward if their opponent chooses to pass and they subsequently chose to take in the following turn. The
game ends on a terminal node, where the player has no choice but to take. Through
backwards induction, a Nash equilibrium can be found at every node, indicating the
player should always choose take, and the initial player should select take on the first
turn and end the game. Ho & Weigelt (2000) performed an experiment on a four turn
centipede game where the net reward would double with each turn, also noting that
the terminal node was (0,0). In practice, the initial player only terminated the game
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30% of the time at their first opportunity, and the second player only took the prize
50% of the time during their first opportunity, again providing evidence of individuals
departing from the most strategic, utility-maximizing decisions. Contradicting the
Nash equilibrium, players tend to exhibit partial cooperation in the first few turns.

2.3.4

The Cognitive Hierarchy Model

Standard analytical methods used to predict player choice such as equilibrium
models, elimination of dominated strategies, and backwards inductions sometimes
fail to match empirical results of actual human play. The cognitive hierarchy (CH)
model is a behavioral game theory model intended to adress these shortcomings in
normal form games.
As a precursor to discussing the CH model, it is important to acknowledge the
competing theory of Level-k (LK) (Stahl 1993), the framework embedded within
the structure of the CH model. The LK model first considers level-0 players, who
choose an action without regard to other players’ strategies or thought processes;
most commonly assumed is that their actions are randomly determined via a uniform
distribution over the possible actions. Level-1 players believe that all other players
are the non-strategic thinkers at level-0, and a level-1 player will select a best response
to their assumption about the others’ expected actions. Level-2 players believe all
other players are level-1 thinkers; level-3 players believe all other players are level-2
players, and so on. Thus, a level-k player always believes they are the most strategic
player in the game, and all other players are level-(k − 1) thinkers. (Stahl & Wilson
1995). In a p-beauty contest game, having p = 23 , level-0 players choose a number at
random. Level-1 players assume the average of all other players’ choices will be 50 so
they will select 32 (50) = 33. Level-2 in the same thought process will choose 22, and
so on for increasingly strategic level-k thinkers.
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The CH model (Camerer, Ho & Chong 2004) attempts to explain the empirical
behaviors found in normal form games by offering an alternative to equilibrium theory.
Similar, to LK models, the CH model looks at the hierarchical levels of iterative
rationalizability for players examining k steps of thinking strategic logic. The iteration
begins with the naive player, the step-0 player who makes no assumptions about
their opponent and makes a choice based on a probability distribution. For sake of
simplicity, Camerer, Ho & Chong (2004) assumes a uniform distribution over the
action space. Differentiating itself from LK theory, in the CH model, a step-k thinker
(i.e., which differs from a level-k thinker) does not assume all others are level-(k − 1)
thinkers. Rather, a step-k thinker (with k > 0) assumes all other opponents are
thinkers whose levels of strategic thought range from step-0 to step-(k − 1), where the
distribution over those levels follows a normalized Poisson distribution. The Poisson
CH model is advantageous as it can be easier to compute using iterative calculations,
beginning with step-0 thinkers, relative to calculating Nash equilibrium for some
games. The Poisson distribution exhibits parsimony with one parameter, τ , making
the mean and variance the same. As τ grows large, the normalized frequencies from
the step-k thinker’s perspective put all the weight on k−1, making the model converge
to a Nash equilibrium as τ → ∞ in games of iterated dominance. For a normal form
game that allows for mixed strategies over the set of available actions, the formal
equation for calculating the expected payoff of a step-k thinker using strategy si , is
given by the following:
m−1

Ei (K) =

X
h=1

π(si , sh−i ) ·

(K−1 "
X

f (c | τ )
PK−1

c=0

c=0

f (c | τ )

#)
· P (h | c)

,

(1)

where the probability that their opponents using step c levels of thought select h is
P (h | c); f (c|τ ) is the frequency of players using k steps of thinking with Poisson distribution mean (τ ); K is a finite upper bound for the highest step of player considered;
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h is the action vector chosen by the opponents; π is the payoff for a combination of
player’s actions; and m is the number of actions available to player i (Camerer 2011).
The cognitive hierarchy model has proven to be effective at modeling observed
empirical results. In a beauty contest data set, using the multiplier p =

2
,
3

the

median estimate for τ was 1.61, which explained the convergence to a value of 30,
instead of the equilibrium of zero. High τ values were estimated (Camerer, Ho &
Chong 2004) in experiments having an equilibrium of zero and subjects consisting of
professional stock market portfolio managers. Other evidence showed a higher τ value
estimate in subject pools composed of more analytically minded and higher educated
individuals. Subjects tended to use more steps of reasoning in higher stakes games
than lower stakes games (τ nearly twice as large). Across the diverse subject pool
and in different experimental games, nearly half of the 90 percent confidence intervals
include τ = 1.5, leaving Camerer et al to suggest this value as reasonable for τ in
untested games.
In an attempt to improve on the results of LK and CH, Chong et al. (2016)
proposed a generalized cognitive hierarchy (GCH) model. The GCH differs from
the other models regarding its assumptions for level-k thinkers’ beliefs about other
players; which subset of other players inform the best response of a level-k thinker;
and what strategy is adopted by level-0 thinkers. GCH leverages a variant of the LK
model called Level-m (LM) which, like the LK model, assumes a level-k player selects
a best response to the action of a player acting at a single, lower level of strategic
thought. Conversely, LM has players best responding to the most frequently occurring
lower level, wherein the frequency of players’ distribution over lower levels of thought
varies based on a scenario-specific assumptions. If the modal level happens to be
k − 1, the LM framework is equivalent to the LK model.
Within the GCH model and LM framework, the frequency of the lower level
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players are weighted with parameter α(≥ 1). An α = 1 implies a level-k 0 s player’s
belief about the lower level players is equal to the its normalized true proportion.
Whereas, α > 1 concentrates the level-k player’s belief about lower level players on
the most frequently occurring level. In a CH model, level-0 players are assumed
to select actions in a uniformly random way; in contrast, the GCH model assumes
that a level-0 player will seek to avoid an action that could yield a minimum payoff.
Partitioning the possible actions into two sets, a level-0 player is assumed to be β
times more likely to select a action in the set of actions that never yields a minimum
payoff than actions outside of this set. GCH has been shown (Chong et al. 2016) to
regress empirical behavior better than CH in four data sets of n × m games, although
this result is, perhaps, unsurprising since GCH contains two additional parameters,
α and β. Since it is not always clear that the reduction in the model’s mean squared
error warrants the inclusion of the additional GCH parameters (Chong et al. 2016),
we utilize the more established CH model in this manuscript.
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III. Test Design and Analysis Methodology

This chapter discusses the test design and methodology underlying analytical techniques used on data gathered from participants’ responses. Section 3.1 presents the
test instrument’s design. Section 3.2 details various quantitative analytical methodologies utilized to examine the results and garner insight with and without the use of
equilibrium structured models.

3.1

Test Instrument
The problem statement was examined by designing, fielding, and analyzing the

results of a computer-based survey instrument. The test instrument was an 18question survey designed using Microsoft’s Forms software. Table 1 presents the
survey framework and structure including, for each question, the size of the game
presented, the communication modality utilized for presentation, and relevant notes.
Question 1 presents the informed consent form per compliance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Appendix A and Appendix B presents the IRB application and the Except Determination findings. Question 2-4 are administrative in
nature, preparing the participant to complete the survey. Question 2 informs the
participant to refrain from revisiting previous questions and changing their answer
to prevent experience gained later from interfering with earlier questions. Question
3 is an audio check, letting the individual confirm a correct audio connection. Question 4 presents a sample question for a small 2 × 2 game, introducing language and
communication modalities used throughout the survey.
Questions 5-16 use three different communication modalities (i.e., audio-only,
visual-only, and audio-and-visual) to present strategic situations of four different sizes
(i.e., 2 × 2, 3 × 3, 4 × 4, and 5 × 5 normal form games). For each of these questions,
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the participant is asked to select an action that maximizes their payoffs considering
their opponent’s payoffs (i.e, a “best response”). In scenarios of 2 × 2 and 4 × 4 size,
the best response is ascertainable by iteratively considering the players’ best response
choices. All 3 × 3 and 5 × 5 scenarios are rationalizable by eliminating strictly dominated strategies. For the 2 × 2 to the 5 × 5 scenarios, the dominant actions are all
labelled as action number 1. Although the payoffs were perturbed in each communication modality of the same game size, we number the remaining actions consistently
according to their ordinal payoff structure.
To isolate communication modality effects, the twelve questions are presented in
three blocks. Audio-only presentations are provided first, followed by visual-only,
and subsequently audio-and-visual questions. Within each block, the questions are
presented in order of increasing complexity, beginning with 2 × 2 scenarios and culminating with 5 × 5 scenarios.
To provide an additional benchmark of group performance against a commonlystudied problem in the literature, Question 17 presents a p-beauty contest scenario,
for which the participant must select a number between zero and 100 in an attempt
to be the closest to two-thirds of the average guess. The participant views a visual
representation of the game with audio reading the words aloud. The final question
serves as an integrity check on the instructions presented in Question 2; the participant answers whether they returned to any previous question and adjusted their
answer. Should this occur, the participant’s answers are not be included within the
analysis. Such an integrity check was required for this study to ensure participants
were not using gained insight from a later question to adjust previous answers.
It should be noted that all 2 × 2 scenario games are modeled with a prisoner’s
dilemma structure (Luce & Raiffa 1957), wherein they are solvable both through iteratively considering each players best response and by eliminating dominated strategies
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Table 1. Test Instrument Design

Scenario Communication
Notes
Size
Modality
1
Informed Consent
2
Survey Instructions
Admin
3
Audio Check
4
Sample Game Orientation
5
2×2
Audio
Iterative Best Response†
6
3×3
Audio
IEDS‡
Block 1
7
4×4
Audio
Iterative Best Response†
8
5×5
Audio
IEDS‡
9
2×2
Visual
Iterative Best Response†
10
3×3
Visual
IEDS‡
Block 2
11
4×4
Visual
Iterative Best Response†
12
5×5
Visual
IEDS‡
13
2×2
A/V*
Iterative Best Response†
14
3×3
A/V*
IEDS‡
Block 3
15
4×4
A/V*
Iterative Best Response†
16
5×5
A/V*
IEDS‡
17
A/V*
p-beauty contest style game
Misc
18
Confirm directions followed
†
Solvable by iteratively considering each player’s best response(s)
‡
Solvable by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies
* Simultaneous audio-and-visual presentation
Block

Question

until only the dominant strategy, i.e., the best response, remains. Alternative game
structures are used for the remaining game and, although the payoffs are perturbed,
the payoffs have the same ordinal structure within a given game size.

3.2

Analysis Methodology
The research herein conducts several analyses on the test data. The following

sections details the respective methodologies and accompanying analytical objectives.
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3.2.1

GCMH Test

Applying the Generalized Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel (GCMH) test to the test results will evaluate the homogeneity of the marginal distributions associated with each
communication modality. Although the GCMH test is designed for discerning conditional independence, (Agresti 2002) illustrates how it can be leveraged to answer
questions regarding marginal homogeneity. If conditional independence is refuted
then so is marginal homogeneity, and the communication modalities are shown to
yield statistically differing response proportions.
The Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel (CMH) test is a statistical method used in the
analysis of matched categorical data. It is a generalized version of the McNemer test,
which only considers pairs of participant’s responses. The CMH test considers an
arbitrary strata size (i.e., more than two participants), K, and examines the binary
association between treatment and a binary outcome.
As a generalization of the CMH test, the GCMH test compares I treatment levels
with J possible outcomes from K total strata, where nijk is a quantity of responses on
treatment level i of action j from participant k (Agresti 2002). Let the null hypothesis,
H0 , be that conditional independence exists between the treatments, where

µk = (n1+k n+1k , n1+k n+2k , ..., nI−1,+,k n+,J−1,k )0 /n++k ,

and the null covariance matrix of nk is denoted by Vk having

cov(nijk , ni0 j 0 k ) =

ni+l (δii0 n++k − ni0 +k )n+jk (δjj 0 n++k − n+j 0 k )
n2++k (n++k − 1)

with δab = 1 when a = b and δab = 0 otherwise.
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Rows and columns are treated as unordered. Summing over the K strata yields
the following calculations:

n=

X

nk ,

µ=

X

µk ,

V=

X

Vk .

The generalized CMH test statistic is

CM H = (n − µ)0 V−1 (n − µ)

with associated p-value

p = P (χ2 ((I − 1)(J − 1)) > CM H).

3.2.2

Multiple Correspondence Analysis

Assuming marginal homogeneity is refuted, we examine the relationships between
participant responses and communication modalities within each scenario size. We
leverage techniques that represent the data as points in a low-dimension Euclidean
space to identify possible relationships or patterns not readily observed using alternative analytical methods.
Correspondence analysis (CA) provides a graphical representation in two-way contingency tables with rows and columns of the data presented as points. The position
of the points on the graphs indicate associations. Multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) is a technique used to detect underlying structures in a data set comprised of
nominal categorical data. MCA is computationally equivalent to CA but allows one
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to analyze a pattern over several dependent variables. MCA applies the CA algorithm
to an indicator matrix or Burt table. Indicator matrices consist of binary elements
showing the individual responses to particular questions, where the rows represent
participants and the columns are the different categorical variables. Analyzing the
indicator matrix allows direct representation of individuals as points in geometric
space. Burt tables are symmetric matrices analogous to covariance matrices of continuous variances (Abdi & Valentin 2007); it equals the products of the indicator
matrix with its transpose.
Assume there are K nominal variables (i.e., the number of categorical variables),
PK
with each variable having JK levels and J =
k=1 Jk holds (i.e., the categorical
variable assumes a single level at each observation). With I observations the I × J
indicator matrix is denoted X. MCA can be conducted either on X or B = XT X
(i.e., the Burt Matrix).
Assuming MCA is conducted on X, the sum of all entries in X is calculated as N .
The MCA procedure proceeds by calculating the probability matrix Z via Z = N −1 X.
Two sets of factors scores result by such an analysis on X: one for the rows and one
for the columns (Abdi & Valentin 2007); however, in this research, we are mainly
concerned with relationships within the column data.
Denoting r as the vector of row totals from Z and c as the column totals, let
Dr =diag{r} and Dc =diag{c}. MCA is then performed by computing the single
value decomposition of the following matrix:

−1

−1

Dr 2 (Z − rcT )Dc 2 = P ∆QT

where P and Q are unitary matrices and ∆ is the diagonal matrix of the singular
values. Factor scores for the rows and columns are obtained, respectively, from the
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following formulations:

−1

φ = Dr 2 P ∆
−1

Γ = Dc 2 Q∆

Interpretation of relationships with MCA is similar to CA and often based on
the proximities between points in a low-dimensional mapping. Interpretations may
vary depending upon the coordinate system utilized; however, proximities are generally only meaningful between points in the same set1 (i.e., comparing rows to rows
or columns to columns). The interpretation of an MCA plot can help identify relationships between points, either from their relative proximities or their respective
proximities to the origin (Abdi & Valentin 2007, Greenacre & Blasius 2006). The
identified dimensions can also be used to interpret the main sources of association
in the data. Qualitative analysis can be utilized to identify the factor associated
with each dimension. We note that the quality of these conclusions is related to
the percentage of total inertia, i.e., the square of the data’s φ coefficient2 , explained
by the selected dimensions (Greenacre & Blasius 2006); however, when performing
MCA with X or B, it is well-known that the total inertia is artificially inflated via
the inclusion of artificial variables and self-comparisons, respectively. As such, the
calculated percentage of explained total inertia in most software packages is a lower
bound on its true value. For more detail on CA and MCA, we refer the reader to
Greenacre & Blasius (2006).
1

As discussed by Greenacre & Blasius (2006), asymmetric maps can be used, in some degree, to
compare row and column points.
q
2
2
The φ coefficient is a measure of association in the data where φ = χN where χ2 is the Pearson
χ2 -statistic and N is the total number of observations.
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3.2.3

τ Value Estimation

We leverage the CH model’s embedded τ parameter to determine the level of
strategic thought utilized by the population in the solution of the normal form game.
Each question taken by all the participants has an associated τ value within the CH
framework. This value represents the mean and variance of the underlying Poisson
distribution for the cognitive hierarchy model, or the level of thinking the population
of participants has exhibited to solve a presented problem.
Calculating τ for each question involves first determining the observational distribution of responses from the participants, i.e., the relative frequency participants
selected a specific action as a response to the scenario. This distribution is compared
to the one found from using Equation (1) for a range of τ values and a set value
for K, the finite upper bound for the highest step of player considered. Empirical
analysis identified that testing a range of τ values from 0 to 5 in increments of 0.01
provided sufficient accuracy (in terms of the upper bound on τ ) and precision (in
terms of granularity of the estimates). Similar analysis showed K = 10 is sufficient
as well. The τ -value yielding the smallest mean-squared error from the experimental
observation is identified as the maximum likelihood estimator for the sample’s true
τ -value. Camerer, Ho & Chong (2004) commented that, in games where the Nash
equilibrium is reachable in finitely many iterations of weakly dominated strategies
(as all question scenarios can be in the survey test instrument), the predictions of
the CH model coincide with the Nash equilibrium as τ → ∞. In samples where the
empirical frequencies conformed with the Nash equilibrium, the τ upper bound serves
as a good approximation to the best fitting model mean.
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3.2.4

τ Percentile Confidence Intervals via Bootstrapping

Since τ is estimated based off the entire population’s behavior, naive utilization of
Equation (1) only provides a point estimate. Conversely, it is desirable to understand
the amount of variability that exists about τ for a given game and communication
modality. To conceptualize this variability, we construct confidence intervals using
bootstrapping techniques to generate multiple samples of the participant response
data (Efron & Tibshirani 1994).
A random, uniform sampling was conducted, with replacement, on the original
data set until the number of observations sampled equaled the total number of original
participants. When sampled during bootstrapping, all of an individual’s responses
were recorded for the new sample to ensure that the individual’s level of strategic
thinking contributed to the calculation of the population’s τ for all questions. Once
enough participants’ responses were sampled, τ -values are calculated for each sample
question using the same technique described in Section 3.2.3. The entire list of τ
values from each 10,000 bootstrapped sample served as the evaluated samples used
to calculate the appropriate confidence intervals.
To gain insight into the τ -values observed in the population across the different scenarios, percentile intervals on τ were calculated for each question using the
bootstrapped sample. Percentile confidence intervals will help preserve the range of
observed τ values, as is a concern with the large amount of bootstrapped samples,
and are less influences by skewness or bias which may occur within human subject
testing data. The percentile interval is denoted

(τ̂α/2 , τ̂1−α/2 )
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where τ̂α/2 and τ̂1−α/2 is the lower α/2 percentile and upper 1 − α/2 percentile, respectively, of all τ values found in the bootstrapped sample for a particular question.
Herein we utilize α = 0.1 as demonstrated by Efron & Tibshirani (1994) and used in
subsequent research by Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin (2004).
With multiple percentile intervals being compared simultaneously comes the risk
of committing a type I error (i.e., a false positive) by performing multiple hypothesis
tests. To counteract the multiple comparison problem, the Bonferroni correction is
applied by dividing α by the total pairs of intervals, denoted as m, being compared
(Dunn 1961). For this research, m = 3 when comparing communication modalities
within the same scenario size, and m = 6 when comparing across the different scenario
sizes for the same communication modality.

3.2.5

p-Beauty Contest Game

The level of thinking found in this study can be compared to similar studies in
the literature, benchmarking the population studied with others to conjecture if the
level of thinking for the considered population was influenced by the audio-and-visual
communication modality.
Question 17 on the test instrument asks players to select a number in a similar
manner to the Keynes’s p-beauty contest (Keynes 1936), where the multiplier is p =

2
3

and the number of participants in the contest is n = 1000. The question is presented
with a visual representation of the game such that the directions are written, and also
read aloud. The Nash equilibrium for this game is zero. The responses by the survey
participants informs a collective assessment of the group’s level of strategic thinking
within the CH framework. Given the CH assumption that Level 0 thinkers chose
randomly, an average response of 33.33 corresponds to Level 1 thinking; an average
of 22.22 to Level 2 thinking; an average of 14.81 to Level 3 thinking; and so on.

38

IV. Testing, Results, and Analysis

This chapter presents and discusses the results of the analyses described in Chapter 3 to the results of the survey. Section 4.1 presents an overview of the survey results. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 apply GCMH testing and MCA techniques to explore
the relationships between the communication modality and an individual’s answer
choice. Multiple correspondence analysis is performed with RStudio’s ca package.
By leveraging ideas from the CH model, Section 4.2.3 investigates the level of strategic thinking exhibited by the population on each game, and identifies whether the
estimated value of τ for the underlying distribution has been affected by the different
communication modalities or game sizes. MATLAB scripts built using parallel for
loops iterate through the determined range of τ to determine the best fitting model.
Bootstrapping uses similar techniques with random samples from the survey. Section
4.2.4 presents the surveyed participants’ results for the p-beauty contest question and
compares the results to related studies in the literature. Finally, Section 4.3 explores
sensitivity analysis with search ranges for values of τ and K, and Section 4.4 summarizes the research findings and discuses the relevance to military planning and decision
making impacts based on communication presentation.

4.1

Survey Test Results
Over four weeks, 76 participants took part in the online survey, requiring an

average of approximately 47 minutes to complete it. Three participants admitted
on question 18 that they returned to a previous question and changed their answer.
These responses were removed from analysis. Of the twelve questions involving a
matrix style game across the three different communication modalities, the majority
of respondents selected the action corresponding to the players’ mutual best response
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(i.e., the Nash equilibrium) for all but three questions. Two of the games wherein a
majority of players selected a dominated strategy coincide with the 4 × 4 scenario size
in the audio-only, and audio-and-visual communication modalities. In both instances,
the best response was selected approximately 30% of the time, where the majority
(i.e., 50-65%) selected one of the alternative, dominated actions for each question.
The third game wherein such behavior was observed corresponds with the audio-andvisual method on the 2 × 2 scenario. Participants selected the dominated action 62%
of the time, conjectured to have been influenced by the moral code defined in Air
Force doctrine (US Air Force 2015). This unexpected selection is discussed in greater
detail in Section 4.2.3. Discussion on the level of strategic thought for all questions,
as defined by the CH model, is discussed in Section 4.2.3.

4.2

Results and Analysis
The experiment yielded the following data presented in Table 2 for the matrix

games. Although the payoffs and presentation order were perturbed in each communication modality, action numbers in Table 2 have the same corresponding ordinal
payoff relationships in their respective game. “Action 1” corresponds with the dominant action, otherwise refered to as the Nash Equilibrium, in each game. Descriptive
statistics of the p-beauty contest results are presented in Table 3. The remainder of
this section is dedicated to further statistical analysis of these results.

4.2.1

GCMH Test

Table 4 displays the calculated GCMH test statistics. In all cases, the associated
p-value is less than 0.01, indicating a significant difference between how the survey
participants responded between at least two of the treatments across all size scenarios.
With a significant difference found in all scenarios, the next phase was to perform
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Table 2. Response Frequencies by Scenario Size and Communication Modality

Scenario Communication Action
Size
Modality
1
2×2
Audio
0.616
3×3
Audio
0.603
4×4
Audio
0.301
5×5
Audio
0.616
2×2
Visual
0.904
3×3
Visual
0.918
4×4
Visual
0.890
5×5
Visual
0.781
2×2
A/V
0.384
3×3
A/V
0.945
4×4
A/V
0.301
5×5
A/V
0.753

Action
2
0.384
0.342
0.082
0.027
0.096
0.041
0.082
0.014
0.616
0.000
0.630
0.014

Action
3

Action
4

Action
5

0.055
0.534
0.260

0.082
0.096

0.000

0.041
0.000
0.055

0.027
0.137

0.014

0.055
0.041
0.219

0.027
0.014

0.000

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics p-beauty Contest Results

Level
Maximum
75th Percentile
50th Percentile
25th Percentile
Minimum
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Value
69
44
33
20
0

Table 4. GCMH Test Statistics

2×2
45.3

3×3
190

4×4
167

5×5
111

pairwise statistical tests on the communication modalities for the different combinations of scenario sizes and pairwise modalities. Table 5 shows all of the calculated test
statistics, and any corresponding p-values found to be less than 0.01 are indicated.
Comparison between the audio and audio-and-visual modalities in the 5 × 5 size
resulted in a singular covariance matrix. The GCMH procedure described in Section 3.2.1 cannot be directly applied in such settings; a corresponding error is often reported in commercial software (SAS 2013). However, some authors (e.g., see
Rayner & Best (2017), Rayner & Rippon (2018)) suggest the use of Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse as a remedy; we adopt such an approach herein for the audio and
audio-and-visual comparison in the 5 × 5 size.
Table 5. GCMH Test Statistic of Pairwise Treatment Comparison

Pairwise Comparison 2 × 2
Audio | Visual
16.3
Audio | Audio & Visual 10.7
Visual | Audio & Visual 34.4

3×3
63
37.3
68.3

4×4
42.2
54.5
64.3

5×5
55.1
6.19*
62.4

*Not a statistically significant value
*Singular covariance matrix; Moore-Penrose psuedoinverse utilized

A statistically significant difference exists for how participants responded to different pairs of communication modalities, for scenario sizes 2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 4 × 4.
When comparing the participants’ selections in size 5 × 5, there was no significant
difference found between the audio-only and the audio-and-visual modalities. For
all other scenario sizes, the visual presentation, whether or not paired with audio,
showed a significant difference in participant response compared to the audio-only
modality questions. Within all scenario sizes, the comparison between the audio-only
and visual-only modalities, as well as the comparison of the visual-only and audio42

and-visual modalities, showed a significant difference. Significant differences were
observed between the audio-only and audio-and-visual modalities in all scenario sizes
except the 5 × 5 questions. One conjecture for this counter-intuitive result derives
from the large size of the scenario; that is, the problem is too difficult for the decision
maker may have been overloaded with information to the point that the communication modality did not induce a difference in behavior. Test fatigue is another possible
factor, as the audio-and-visual modality of size 5 × 5 was the final question among
this block of twelve questions.

4.2.2

Multiple Correspondence Analysis

Figure 1 presents the MCA plots in principal coordinates by scenario size as
calculated with the Burt matrix. Each point represents a possible response to the
question. The first number is the communication modality (i.e., 1 for audio-only, 2
for visual-only, 3 for audio-and-visual), and the second number indicates a specific
response from the list of possible actions for the given question. A response never
chosen by survey participants is not depicted on the corresponding plot. For the 2×2,
3 × 3, 4 × 4, and 5 × 5 games, note that the total inertia is 86.6%, 60.0%, 57.2%, and
34.6%, respectively. Given the MCA properties discussed in Section 3.2.2, a sufficient
percentage of total inertia is explained in each scenario to proceed with meaningful
analysis.
Utilizing the MCA plots, we can analyze each dimension to determine what are
the factors driving associations in the data. The horizontal dimensions of Figures 1a1d can respectively be interpreted as separating actions based on modality. Scenarios
2 × 2 and 3 × 3 show a separation of Actions 1 and 2 and separation of Actions 1
and 3 from Action 2, respectively. The horizontal dimension for Figure 1c shows a
separation in Action 4 for the visual-only and audio-and-visual modalities. Similarly,
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Figure 1d delineates between actions in the audio-and-visual modality. The vertical
dimension of Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d can be interpreted, respectively, as separating
players who played Action 2 in the visual-only modality; differentiating the selection
of Action 3 in the audio-only modality for size 3 × 3 and selection of Action 4 in the
audio-and-visual modality for size 4 × 4.
Based on the inferred dimensions, it can be observed that behavior on the visualonly modality is central to the association observed in the data. This is further
emphasized by visual inspection of the plots with respect to point proximity; doing
so allows us to describe associations in the data more granularly.
In Figure 1a, notice the proximity between Points 1:2 and 3:2 as well as Points 1:1
and 3:1. This implies that participants who chose the dominant action in the audioonly modality tended to select the dominant action in the audio-and-visual modality,
same with Action 2; however, this association did not translate to the visual-only
modality. Figure 1b presents negative associations were present based upon player
selections in the visual-only modality: selecting Action 3 in the visual-only modality
suggested a tendency to not select Action 3 in the audio-and-visual modality, whereas
selecting Action 2 in the visual modality implies a tendency to not select Action 3 in
the audio-only modality. Figure 1c observes a similar negative association between the
selection of Action 2 in the visual-only modality and Action 4 in the audio-and-visual
modality, where a positive association can be observed between Action 4 between the
same modalities. Figure 1d observed another negative association between selecting
Action 2 in the visual-only and audio-and-visual modalities. Collectively these results
imply an underlying factor influencing different responses from participants, which
can be attributed to the different communication modalities.
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(a) 2 × 2 Scenarios

(b) 3 × 3 Scenarios

(c) 4 × 4 Scenarios

(d) 5 × 5 Scenarios

Figure 1. MCA Plots by Scenario Size

4.2.3

τ Value Analysis

Using the techniques set forth in Section 3.2.3, Table 6 presents the participants’
estimated τ value with associated mean squared error (MSE) in Table 7 for each
question. Notable for each game size is the increase of τ from an audio-only to a visualonly communication modality. This increase is also seen between the visual-only and
audio-and-visual modalities for scenario sizes 3×3 and 4×4. The largest MSE between
the observed participants’ response distribution and experimental distribution from
the CH model was 0.05 from the audio-only question of size 5×5. Half of all questions
yielded an MSE less than 0.005. The CH model performed well at estimating the
distribution of participant responses with MSE for all 12 questions summing to 0.19.
The decrease in τ seen in the 5 × 5 scenario size may be a result of similar con45

Table 6. Estimated τ Values for All Questions

Communication
2×2 3×3 4×4 5×5
Modality
Audio
0.27 0.52 0.48 0.74
Visual
1.65 2.09 1.92 1.29
Audio & Visual
0.00 2.50 2.02 1.18
Table 7. MSE on τ Values for All Questions

Communication
2×2 3×3 4×4 5×5
Modality
Audio
0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05
Visual
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Audio & Visual
0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03
jectures made in Section 4.2.1 regarding the pairwise comparisons of participants’
responses. The relatively worse performance is conjectured to be caused by either the
larger problem size, or by participant test fatigue.
The audio-and-visual question of size 2 × 2 shows a notable decrease in the estimated τ -value to 0.00, a result that merits further discussion. An estimate of τ = 0
indicates participants’ responses are no better than an equiprobable, random guess.
Because Question 13 is associated with the audio-and-visual modality, it is presented
as a written scenario that was also read aloud, accompanied by a 2 × 2 matrix depicting player payoffs. In the audio-only and visual-only modalities associated with
this scenario size, most of the participants managed to deduce the best response,
indicating that some factor unique to Question 13 influenced the outlying result.
Based on a post hoc analysis of the test question, a common characteristic among
survey participants, and informal feedback from survey participants, we conjecture
that participants’ ethics precluded the selection of more strategically minded actions
for Question 13. This specific question involved the participant and their counterpart
fixing a piece of gym equipment. A supervisor would later ask whether the individual
had any help in the repair process or did the repairs alone. In this scenario, akin
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to Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce & Raiffa 1957), the options were to either “tell the
truth” or “lie,” wherein the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is for both
players to “lie”. Results showed that 60.5% of participants elected to “tell the truth.”
Likely relevant to the seemingly non-strategic group performance on Question 13 is
that every participant was either an active duty military or civilian employee in the
Department of Defense, taking classes at the Air Force Institute of Technology, a
technical graduate school run by the United States Air Force. Among the three core
values of the Air Force, the first value is “Integrity First” (US Air Force 2015); honesty
is valued above all else. Although “lie” is the best strategic response to Question 13, it
is anathema to the explicit organizational values of the participants. Moreover, several
survey participants approached one of the co-authors after completing the survey
to express their angst over Question 13. Each such voluntary statement indicated
that they knew what the utility-maximizing dominant action was, but they did not
think that “lie” is an answer they could willingly select. Additionally, considering
their honesty to influence the opposing player’s payoff maximizing choice in action,
participants disclosed they believed opposing players would follow a similar strategy
and choose a moral action based on a similar ideology.
Figure 2 shows the frequency of all estimated τ values from the 10,000 bootstrapped samples created from the 76 participants’ responses. When all sampled
participant answers were the dominant action, τ was estimated to be 5.00 (i.e, the
upper bound on the preset range), because the best fitting τ to the observed selection
approaches infinity. In all size scenarios, the mode τ for the visual-only question was
larger than the mode τ for the audio-only questions of the same size. Question sizes of
3×3 and 4×4 show the audio-and-visual questions yielding a generally higher τ value
relative to audio-only questions; however, there not an extensive distinction from the
visual-only questions. Scenario sizes of 5×5 have the most considerable overlap in the
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τ values, showing less positive influence from the additional presentation modality as
seen in the 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 scenarios. It is possible the modality had little effect on the
individuals’ responses due to the complexity of the problem. Alternatively, the 5 × 5
scenarios were positioned last in the presentation set of questions, and test fatigue
may have influenced the participants’ choices.

(a) 2 × 2 Scenarios

(b) 3 × 3 Scenarios

(c) 4 × 4 Scenarios

(d) 5 × 5 Scenarios

Figure 2. Frequency of Estimated τ from 10,000 Bootstrapped Samples

Figure 3 displays the percentile confidence intervals for each scenario size across
the different communication modalities. In scenarios of size 2 × 2, 3 × 3, and 4 × 4,
there is a significant difference in the intervals between audio-only and visual-only
modalities, as they display no overlap. Such an overlap does appear in the 5 × 5
scenario, but the upper bound of the visual-only confidence interval exceeds the upper
bound of the audio-only modality by over 0.6 indicating a higher likelihood of higher
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levels of strategic thought observable in the population. Similarly, the audio-andvisual modality’s upper bound exceeds the upper bound of the audio-only modality
in all cases but the 2 × 2 scenario, where the audio-and-visual modality question
was affected by the participants’ ethical judgements. In the 3 × 3, 4 × 4, and 5 × 5
scenarios, the audio-and-visual modality interval remains relatively consistent with
minor variation compared to the visual-only modality.

(a) 2 × 2 Scenarios

(b) 3 × 3 Scenarios

(c) 4 × 4 Scenarios

(d) 5 × 5 Scenarios

Figure 3. Percentile Confidence Intervals Across Scenario Size

Figure 4 presents the effect of increasing scenario difficulty across the different
communication modalities. Although no statistical difference were observed, we note
the following. In the audio-only modality, there is a steady increase in the interval’s
mode an upper bound. An increase in τ as difficulty increases is an unexpected
outcome. One may expect the average level of strategic thought in a population to
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decrease and eventually reach zero as the question’s size and difficulty increase. While
perhaps counterintuitive, it should be noted that the largest upper bound achieved
across the scenarios in the audio-only modality is similar in value to the smallest lower
bound observed in the visual-only and audio-and-visual modalities. Visual-only and
audio-and-visual modalities see an increase in upper bound and mode from the 2 × 2
to the 3 × 3 scenarios, but then see a steady decrease in value from the 3 × 3 to the
4 × 4 and, eventually, the 5 × 5 scenario. The increase is conjectured to be caused
by the simplicity of the 2× scenarios not requiring large amounts of mental energy,
whereas the 3 × 3 was complicated enough to elicit a strategic response, but simple
enough for good performance to be achieved. In all the 3 × 3 and larger scenarios,
the audio-and-visual modality had non-significantly different confidence intervals to
the visual-only modality but did have a larger upper bound.

4.2.4

p-beauty contest

The average response for the p-beauty contest (i.e., Question 14) was 31.02. This
value corresponds to τ ≈ 1.65. Camerer, Ho & Chong (2004) observed that, across 24
similar instances, a median estimate for τ of 1.61, indicating the observed τ for this
study is similar to their results. The small difference between these numbers reveals
the audio-and-visual communication modality did not exhibit a significant impact on
the level of strategic thought. This corresponds with the results observed in Section
4.2.3.
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(a) Audio-only

(b) Visual-only

(c) Audio-and-Visual

Figure 4. Percentile Confidence Intervals Across Modality

4.3

Sensitivity Analyses
Two sensitivity analyses were conducted that inform the preceding analysis, and

each merits some discussion. To calculate τ in Section 4.2.3, a predetermined range
to explore the best fitting value was set to τ ∈ [0, 5]. Additionally, the fixed value
of K, the finite upper bound for the highest step of player, was chosen arbitrarily
as 10, under the presumption that double the maximum observed value would be
sufficient. Various ranges for τ and values for K were explored to ensure the τ
estimate’s accuracy. The largest range was τ ∈ [0, 15] with K = 30. The greater
value of K and wider interval of τ values considered had no impact on the analytic
results; they attained the same τ -values reported in Table 6. The narrower interval for
τ and lesser K-value were accordingly selected to reduce unnecessary computational
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requirements to complete the analysis.
When iterating through different values of τ to determine which was the best
estimate for the model, we decided to iterate by increments of one hundredth (0.01)
instead of something more precise, e.g., increments of one thousandth (0.001). Much
of the related CH literature present estimates of τ to the hundredth place (e.g., see
Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin (2004) and Camerer, Ho & Chong (2004)). Nevertheless, we explored the effect of estimating τ -values with this higher level of precision,
for the same range of τ ∈ [0, 5] and with K = 10, and using the techniques presented
in Section 3.2.3. Table 5 reports the estimated τ -values at this higher level of precision. The difference in the sum of mean squared errors between the τ -values reported
in Tables 6 and 8 is 1.9 × 10−5 . The extra computational effort required to calculate
more precise τ -values resulted in a negligible difference in precision. Hence, τ values
were estimated to the hundredth place as demonstrated.
Table 8. Estimated τ Values to Thousandths Place

Communication
2×2 3×3 4×4 5×5
Modality
Audio
0.265 0.518 0.476 0.735
Visual
1.651 2.093 1.923 1.295
Audio & Visual
0.000 2.499 2.023 1.177

4.4

Discussion
Analysis of the GCMH test indicates that communication modality has a statis-

tically significant effect on the participant’s actions. Further investigation regarding
the GCMH test statistics and their associated p-values for pair-wise comparisons indicate a significant difference in participant answer selection between all other communication modalities except between audio-only and audio-and-visual communication
modalities in the 5×5 scenario. The MCA analysis showed differentiation from action
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choices across all scenarios dependant on an underlying factor possibly attributable
to the different communication modalities. In multiple cases, the same actions were
negatively associated with each other across different modalities, indicating the participant’s selection of specific actions being influenced by the presentation.
Visual-only questions showed a statistically significant increase in the level of
strategic thought exhibited by the population over audio-only questions. This phenomenon was also observed between audio-and-visual and audio-only modalities with
some caveats in the larger, more difficult 5 × 5 size questions as well as the morality
affected question in the 2 × 2 scenario. When confronted with a smaller question of
size 2 × 2 that also involved an ethical dilemma between being honest or dishonest,
participants seemed to consciously select the dominated action of “telling the truth,”
thereby dropping the estimated τ to zero. Although such a value of τ coincides with
non-strategic choice, the truth seems more nuanced. It is likely the case that the
game’s payoff did not adequately represent the players’ utilities. This phenomena is
reminiscent of results discussed by Camerer (2011) regarding the effects of varying
demographic variables on observed behavior in the Dictator, Ultimatum and Trust
games.
Finally, presenting a p-beauty contest question using a combined audio-and-visual
communication modality did not seem to affect or influence the population’s level of
strategic thinking since the average response, 31.02, was similar to average responses
of participants from other experiments reported in the literature.
Multimedia learning stresses the importance of audio and visual modalities simultaneously being present to maximize cognitive processing in an individual. Research conducted here expected the audio-and-visual scenarios to perform best, i.e.,
compared to the audio-only and visual-only. Some outperformance indications were
present in the 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 size games in the sampled populations values for τ , but
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the bootstrapped samples did not find statistical significance between these communication modalities. However, a significant difference was observed in an individual’s
responses based on communication modality in all pairwise commissions, across all
scenario sizes, except audio-only and audio-and-visual in the 5 × 5 questions.

4.4.1

Relevance to Military Planning

Information is shared with a commander and his staff in a myriad of manners.
Much of the information given to military planners is communicated verbally in meetings and round table discussions (audio-only) or via written correspondence in reports, PowerPoint presentations, and other large written documents (visual-only).
This research has shown that a higher level of strategic thought can be achieved by
commanders and their staffs when audio-only communication is avoided and a visual
modality is included. Additionally, when the information is presented with the audioand-visual modality, planners’ strategic thought decreases at a seemingly slower rate
as the scenario’s difficulty increases in comparison to the visual-only modality.
This research sought to understand how different forms of cognitive processing
affects strategic decision making to enable better decision making in the military.
Herein, we showed that visual-only presentation of information is more beneficial than
audio-only. The combinations of audio-and-visual modalities can achieve a higher
upper bound on the levels of strategic thought as difficulty increases compared to
the visual-only modality. However, as the difficulty surpasses a certain threshold; the
extra auditory presentation did not improve the level of strategic thinking. This result
implies that information presentation should be tailored to the military operation. For
moderately complex operations, there is potentially great benefit to the combined
audio-and-visual presentation of information. However, for exceedingly large and
complex activities at the theater-level, the verbal modality (e.g., written) dominates.
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Finally, it must be highlighted that our results illustrated a fundamental character
of the US military. When confronted with a morally divisive choice, our participants
seemed to willing chose the “less strategic” option based upon its perceived immorality. This results suggests that the core values instilled in Air Force doctrine do indeed
guide the strategic decision making of its members.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter summarizes this research’s contributions and proposes future research
directions based on the limitations and methodologies. Section 5.1 reviews the study’s
goals, techniques used, and provides a summary of the results found. Section 5.2
presents futures considerations and alterations to the test design and methodologies
from this research.

5.1

Conclusions
This research explored how cognitive processing in a competitive situation, mod-

eled with normal form games of various difficulties (measured by the size of a scenario’s
action space), affects a sample’s population’s ability to reach sound, strategic decisions. The communication modalities considered in assessing the strategic nature of
decisions, which were evaluated with and without non-equilibrium structural models,
were audio-only, visual-only, and the combinations of audio-and-visual. Necessary
to conduct this analysis was the measurement of the population’s level of strategic
thought and the evaluation of changes in strategic thought based on the different
modalities and situation complexity.
The computer based test instrument consisted of 18 questions: four administrative
questions; three blocks of questions accounting for each communication modality and
scenario size combination, increasing in difficulty, starting with 2 × 2 and culminating with 5 × 5 for a total of 12 questions; and two miscellaneous questions including
a p-beauty game and an integrity check on whether the participant followed the
test’s instructions. Analysis was conducted using the Generalized Cochran-MantelHaenszel test and multiple correspondence analysis to study associations in participant responses by communication modality and question difficulty. To evaluate a
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population’s average level of strategic thinking, we applied the Cognitive Hierarchy
model to find a value of τ for each question. Bootstrapping was utilized to develop
percentile confidence intervals on τ to examine the effect of different communication modalities and scenario difficulty on the population’s average level of strategic
thought. A similar methodology was used for the p-beauty contest question to determine the population’s average level of strategic thinking and compare it to results in
the published literature.
The analysis found that participants answered questions differently across all the
different communication modalities. The only exception was the pairwise comparison
made between the audio-only and audio-and-visual modalities on the 5 × 5 question,
where participants did not respond in a statistically different manner. The average
level of strategic thought (i.e., the τ -value estimated for the population) increased
between audio-only and visual-only communication modalities. The value of τ increased further in the audio-and-visual modality for scenario sizes 3 × 3 and 4 × 4.
The bootstrapped confidence intervals revealed similar results with a significant increase between audio-only and visual-only modalities for all scenarios, and a larger
upper bound for the audio-and-visual modality compared to visual-only modality in
scenarios of size 3 × 3 and 4 × 4. Visual-only and audio-and-visual modalities showed
an increase in strategic thought from 2 × 2 to 3 × 3 games, attributed to simplicity of
the smaller scenario requiring less cognitive processing, followed by a steady decrease
as the difficulty increased to the maximum 5 × 5 scenario. Across all scenario sizes,
a significant increase existed in the population’s average level of strategic thought in
the visual-only questions as compared to the audio-only. The p-beauty contest question estimated a population’s τ -value to be of 1.65, comparable to literature where
the median τ -value was found to be 1.61 across 24 similar test instances (Camerer,
Loewenstein & Rabin 2004).
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Audio-and-visually presented questions were expected to outperform audio-only
and visual-only questions based on concepts from the theory of multimedia learning,
indicating the additional communication modalities acting on a person simultaneously
would allow more cognitive processing to occur. In scenarios of size 3 × 3 and 4 ×
4, the population surveyed observed a larger level of strategic thinking, but this
difference was not statistically significant. However, the analysis did show a difference
in individuals’ responses between different communication modalities.
During testing, an exception was discovered that significantly reduced the participants’ level of strategic thought when presented a problem using the audio-and-visual
modality. The 2 × 2 question presented a scenario with a set of actions that generated a simultaneous ethical dilemma. Most players chose to “tell the truth” over the
alternative “lie.” Such a choice resulted in the average level of strategic thought, τ ,
to be equal to zero; individuals were effectively acting non-strategically. The population observed in this question illustrated that their tendency to identify the dominant
action was affected by the ethical factors.

5.2

Future Research Considerations
Future research can expand on the created test instrument and present it to par-

ticipants in person instead of via the computer-based system survey. In-person proctoring could modify questions with a person verbally providing communication for
audio-only questions and the different methods to consider alternative visual-only
presentation techniques, such as presentation slides on a computer or drawings on a
whiteboard. Such presentation will allow for analysis of conversational communication that could not be examined herein.
The population studied during this experiment could also be expanded in further
research. Beyond just the graduate school members surveyed, participation could in-
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clude more personnel within the Air Force, including different occupations, as a means
to explore how different career specialities compare in their responses for different
communication modalities and/or problem complexities. Additionally, the methods
utilized herein can be utilized as a measure of effectiveness for military professional
education. Military professional schools such as the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced
Military Studies and the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies are
designed to produce strategic minded officers. By considering these schools as a
“treatment”, the student body’s level of strategic thought can be measured upon
enrollment and after graduation. The analysis presented herein can be replicated to
determine what (if any) statistical increase occurred in the study body’s ability to
think strategically. Doing so can inform changes to officer professional development
throughout the U.S. military.
Much of this research leveraged concepts from Mayer’s theory of multimedia learning (Mayer 2009) to establish the type of communication modalities that would best
help an individual learn and then solve a given problem. Other types of learning
theories exist and could serve as a focus for further research, such as VARK learning
styles (Fleming & Mills 1992).
Alternative analysis to the CH model is also of interest. Additional methods to
determine whether a participant is thinking harder or using more critical reasoning
than explored herein. For example, Kahneman (2011) discusses how one could measure a participant’s pupil size since pupils have been observed to dilate wider when
an individual is acting in critical thinking and problem-solving situations. Such a
research extension is compelling, and it may be interesting to discern between level
of effort and successful outcomes among participants.
Finally, one question on the test instrument unintentionally induced an ethical
dilemma that limited the participant’s ability to select the dominant action versus

59

the action that was deemed by most participants to be morally correct. The question
asked participants to either tell the truth or lie, where lying was the mutual best response for the player and their counterpart. Exploring the limitations and boundaries
of morally charged problems could be investigated. The question here was a small
2 × 2 scenario involving being honest or dishonest. However, our results imply that it
is worthwhile to determine whether larger problems of a similar nature or problems
under more extreme conditions, such as those involving another human’s health and
livelihood, cause a similar drop in the level of strategic thought. Other factors to
explore include the rank, position, experience level, and seniority of the population.
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